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The existence of a causal relationship between defendant's act
or omission and plaintiff's injury is an essential element in any
negligence action.' In Maharias v. Weathers Brothers Moving &
Storage Company2 defendant used a room in his warehouse for
refinishing furniture and had allowed rags soaked with inflam-
mable liquid to accumulate in a corner. A fire started and spread to
plaintiff's adjoining building. Expert testimony showed that the
fire could have started by spontaneous combustion, but that it was
possible that it had started from any one of a number of sources.
The court affirmed a non-suit for insufficient evidence of the causal
relationship. There were three distinct possibilities. The fire could
have started (1) in the rags and from spontaneous combustion,
(2) in the rags but from an outside source, or (3) at another place
within the room and without fault on the part of the defendant. If
defendant's liability was to hinge on whether the fire actually
started in the rags, then perhaps the court was justified in refusing
to allow the case to go to the jury since there was no way to de-
termine exactly where the fire started. However, even if this be the
case, it seems strongly arguable that the very fact that defendant
allowed a condition to exist which created a risk of fire should, in
itself, go far toward establishing the chain of causation. But why
should the point at which the fire started be determinative? In a
California case,' the defendant had stored large quantities of paint
The traditional test which courts have applied to determine whether
the causal relationship exists is the familiar "but for" rule-but for the
negligence the injury would not have occurred. Although this rule has not
gone without criticism, see, e.g., Green, The Causal Relationship Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MicE. L. Rav. 543 (1962), it has been used effectively
in the great majority of the cases. However, in a limited number of cases
involving multiple causation the rule has proven inadequate, and courts
have formulated the "substantial factor" test-was defendant's negligence a"substantial factor" in contributing to the plaintiff's injury? See Anderson
v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920),
where the fire set by defendant merged with a second fire from another
source. Either one, acting alone, would have produced the same result.
Obviously the "but for" rule would not impose liability, but the defendant's
negligence was a "substantial factor" in contributing to the loss. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
2257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548 (1962).
' Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285
P.2d 364 (1955).
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thinner on the premises. Even though he was not responsible for
the starting of the fire, the court held that the evidence was ample
to warrant the conclusion that the inflammable material contributed
substantially to the spread of the fire and increased the difficulty of
fighting it. It has been suggested that a similar approach could have
been taken in Maharias.4
In the recent case of Phelps v. Winston-Salem' the city's agent
was the manager of a large building in which stalls were rented to
local produce dealers. One of the tenants had built a shed in which
he "cured" tomatoes. The roof of the shed was cluttered with
crates, paper, and other debris. The exhaust pipe from an oil
heater protruded through the roof and on a previous occasion had
started a small fire. The manager had never reported this incident,
nor had he taken steps to see that the combustibles were removed.
There was also evidence of several "pot-bellied" stoves being in the
building, and one tenant had been allowed to store cylinders of
ethylene gas. A nightwatchman first saw the fire "about two feet
over the top of the Blalock shed."' It was small, "something 'like
two feet high."'7 He barely had time to alert the other tenants be-
fore there was an explosion which spread the fire." Firemen ar-
rived and seemed to have the situation under control when a second
explosion put the entire building in flames.' In affirming a non-suit
the court said that the jury should not be allowed to "speculate" on
the origin of the fire.10 The eyewitness testimony of the nightwatch-
man, together with other evidence, was more than adequate to
'See Note, Spreading Fires, Tenth Annual Survey of North Carolina
Case Law, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 521 (1963).
272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967). Plaintiff also alleged that defen-
dant was negligent in failing to provide firefighting equipment. The court
held that lack of such equipment was not a causal factor because there was
nothing to show that the nightwatchman would have had time to use it.
Accord, Wainwright v. Jackson, 291 Mass. 100, 195 N.E. 896 (1935).
- 272 N.C. 24, 27, 157 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1967).
Record at 82: "the fire was very small .... " record at 89.
' Record at 83, 86.
'Record at 41.
"The court cited Maguire v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 154 N.C. 384, 70
S.E. 737 (1911), for the proposition that the plaintiff must prove the origin
of the fire. However, in Maguire the only evidence was that defendant's
train passed by two hours before the fire was discovered on plaintiff's ad-
joining land. Contrary to a statement in Phelps, there was insufficient evi-
dence of a foul right-of-way. Other railroad cases where there was evidence
of a foul right-of-way held that defendant was liable when sparks from the
engine ignited combustibles on the right of way, and circumstantial evidence
was sufficient to prove this. See cases cited note 14 infra.
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sustain the inference that the fire actually started in the combustibles
on the roof of the shed." However, the opinion of the court is
unclear as to whether it accepts this explanation, or whether it is
concerned with the possibility that the fires started elsewhere and
somehow spread to the top of the shed. As previously pointed out,
the point at which the fire started should make no difference." If
it did start in the combustibles, then it is a reasonable assumption
that they were ignited by the heater flue as on the previous occasion.' 3
In refusing to submit this possibility to the jury, the court has taken
a very restrictive view of the probative value of circumstantial evi-
dence. In McRainey v. Virginia & Carolina Southern Railway,4
the evidence was also purely circumstantial. Defendant-railroad al-
lowed its right-of-way to become cluttered with combustible material.
The fire was discovered more than three hours after the train had
passed. No one saw the engine emitting sparks and there was no
evidence of burned cinders on the right-of-way. The jury was al-
lowed to infer that the spark which ignited the material had come
from defendant's engine. If the Phelps fire started at another loca-
tion and was communicated to the roof of the shed, the combustibles
were still a substantial factor in contributing to its spread. 5 Ad-
mittedly this might not be the proper analysis had the fire been a
conflagration by the time it reached the shed, but evidence clearly
shows that the fire was very small when first seen.
In concerning itself with the origin of the fire, the court in
Phelps overlooks the possibility that the ethylene gas cylinders could
have caused one or both of the explosions. Although the fire chief
stated that the cause of the explosions was unknown,'" there was
11 Record at 40, 82, 86, 89.
" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
"8There was some question as to whether the oil heater had been lighted
on the day of the fire; see Brief for Appellee at 6, and Brief for Appellant at
28. However, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
would seem to support the inference that the heater flue could have been hot.
14 168 N.C. 570, 84 S.E. 851 (1915). See also Gainey v. Rockingham
R.R., 235 N.C. 114, 68 S.E.2d 780 (1951); Betts v. Southern Ry., 230 N.C.
609, 55 S.E.2d 76 (1949),; Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174
N.C. 220, 93 S.E. 736 (1917). For two recent fire cases which give an indi-
cation of the quantum of evidence that will be sufficient to avoid a non-suit,
see Drum v. Baisner, 252 N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960) and Patton v.
Dail, 252 N.C. 425, 114 S.E.2d 87 (1960).
ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
"° Record at 48, 50.
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testimony which negated several other possible explanations, 17 and
further testimony indicated that at least one exploded cylinder had
been found.1
8
Another fire case which deals with the cause issue is Broughton
v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.9 The prior lessee of the
filling station testified that he noticed the odor of gasoline while
digging near a large underground storage tank. His records indi-
cated that the tank was losing ten gallons per day. The tank was
buried so that it was on a level with the basement of the station, and
the ground sloped in that direction. A few months after decedent's
employer took over the station a heavy rain caused the basement to
flood. A three-fourths-inch coating of gas was found on the top of
the water. The basement was drained and cleaned, but three days
later the fumes were again noticeable. When the manager struck a
match to assist a customer in looking for his keys, a bluish flame ap-
peared along the floor. The customer and manager escaped but de-
cedent was killed in the ensuing explosion. The court held that there
was insufficient evidence of negligence, but also stated that the evi-
dence of causal relationship was inadequate, alluding to the possi-
bility that gas could have gotten into the basement due to improper
use of the pumping equipment by the filling station attendants.
However, in Masten v. Texas Company0 the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury. Plaintiff's well
had contained pure water prior to the installation of defendant's
gas pumps. There was a strata of rock which ran from the pumps
to the well, and the slope of the ground was in the same direction.
Plaintiff recovered for contamination of his well.
Two "harmful substance" cases take a very harsh approach, and
illustrate how one unjust decision may lead to another. The cases
are particularly significant because they deal with the evidentiary
requirements unclouded by any subsidiary elements of multiple
causation or intervening cause. In the first case, Wall v. Trogdon,21
the plaintiff and two witnesses testified that they saw defendant's
cropdusting plane emit spray as it circled near the fish pond, that
they noticed an oily substance on the surface of the water, and that
17Record at 43, 56.
'8 Record at 57, 61.
"201 N.C. 282, 159 S.E. 321 (1931).
20194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927).
21249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959).
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immediately thereafter the fish began to die. An expert fish biologist
testified that several other possible causes had been ruled out and that
poisoning was the "only possible cause of death" 22 which he could
discover. In affirming a non-suit the court discounted the expert
opinion as "purely speculative and founded on possibilities,"2 and
indicated that the plaintiff should have offered evidence of the con-
stituent elements of the spray, that the oily substance on the water
was the spray, that it was poisonous to fish, and that it did in fact
kill plaintiff's fish.
Other jurisdictions do not seem to impose such harsh require-
ments. In S.A. Gerrard Company v. Fricker4 the defendant con-
tended that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the sub-
stance which allegedly killed his bees was in fact poisonous to them.
The court held that the mere fact that the substance come into con-
tact with the bees and that they died was sufficient. And in Pitch-
fork Land and Cattle Company v. King 5 the plaintiff brought an
action for damages allegedly caused by defendant's negligence in al-
lowing herbicide chemicals to drift into the plaintiff's crops. Defen-
dant, contending that there was no causal relationship, offered ex-
pert testimony that the effects of such a chemical would appear not
more than ten days after application and that the damage to plain-
tiff's crops did not appear until fifteen days after the crop spraying.
Evidence also showed that the damage was confined to a narrow strip
rather than a wide area as would be expected if the spray had been
dispersed by the wind. An expert testified that he had seen such a
confined damage pattern before and that the more probable explana-
tion was that an airplane which was leaking spray had flown over
the plaintiff's land. The damaged crops were located from seven
and one-half to fifteen miles from the point at which the cropdusting
22 Id. at 751, 107 S.E.2d at 760.
"Id. at 754, 107 S.E.2d at 762.
" 4 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933) ; see Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259,
194 P.2d 454 (1948); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846,
136 S.W.2d 484 (1940). See- generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950).
" 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598 (1961). See Casey v. Phillips Pipeline
Co., 431 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1967) "(Evidence which showed that there had been
a rupture of a high pressure gasoline line, that it was in close proximity to
plaintiff's lake, that a "mist" was seen hanging over the lake, that the lake
water was used to water plaintiff's grass crop, and that soon thereafter the
grass died, was held sufficient to establish the causal relationship). See also
Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945) (Evi-
dence held sufficient even though etymologist testified that they did not know
what killed plaintiff's trees).
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had been conducted. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
on the issue of cause to be submitted to the jury. In a North Caro-
lina case, Nance v. Merchant's Fertilizer & Phosphate Company,2
evidence tended to show that the defendant emptied waste into a
stream. Heavy rains caused the stream to overflow into plaintiff's
pasture. Soon afterwards his hogs began to die. Examination of
the hogs' entrails showed that they were perforated and traces of
acid were found in samples of mud from the pasture. The court
held that even though the evidence was circumstantial, "the proba-
tive force was for them [the jury]-not us."
'27
In the second "harmful substance" case, Reason v. Singer Sew-
ing Machine Company,28 the court relied heavily on Wall. Plaintiff
was sprayed in the face with oil from defendant's defective sewing
machine and two hours later her eyes began to burn and water. A
doctor who examined her the next day testified that the second de-
gree burns on her eyelids could have been caused by "either hot oil
. . . or warm oil so spraying, depending on the chemical composi-
tion."29 The court said that the plaintiff had not shown the chemical
composition of the oil or that it was hot. The case never reached the
jury. Admittedly questions of physical injury may reach a point
where difficult problems of medical causation are involved8W But
where the relationship between act and injury is of such a na-
ture that the layman can readily comprehend cause and effect,
there seems to be no justification for such an approach. Indeed,
the court has held on previous occasions where the question of
causation appeared to be much more obscure that the issue was for
the jury. For example, in Metz v. City of Asheville3 the court al-
lowed the jury to find that pollution of the stream which ran near
decedent's house could have caused his death from typhoid, even
28200 N.C. 702, 158 S.E. 486 (1931).
2 Id. at 706, 158 S.E. at 488.
8 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963).
29Id. at 266, 130 S.E.2d 398.
8oThe question of medical causation is clearly beyond the scope of this
note. However, for some case law in this area, Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C.
317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1964) (proof insufficient to establish causal relation-
ship between blow to plaintiff's back and ruptured disc); Lee v. Stephens,
251 N.C. 429, 111 S.E.2d 623 (1959) (proof insufficient to establish causal
relationship between head injury and cerebral hemorrhage); Byrd v. Ex-
press Co., 139 N.C. 273, 51 S.E. 851 (1905) (proof insufficient to estab-
lish causal relationship between failure to deliver medicine on time and
death of a patient). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 487 (1965).
' 150 N.C. 748, 64 S.E. 881 (1909).
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though neither his wife nor his child caught the disease. And in
Cook v. Town of Mebane32 testimony indicated that there never had
been pools of stagnant water or mosquitoes prior to defendant's
polluting the stream with sewage. The court held that the question
of whether the pollution caused plaintiff's mill workers to get
malaria was for the jury. In Harper v. Bullock33 the jury was al-
lowed to find the causal relationship where decedent died after eating
weiners which contained decomposed meat, although another who
had eaten them did not die, and although decedent's doctor testified
that she had been suffering from nephritis and did not die from the
effects of the meat.
There may be many factors contributing to the approach which
the court has taken in these cases, and an attempt to enumerate them
would be impractical. The most obvious factor is simply a failure
to give the proper probative value to circumstantial evidence. Of
course the burden of proof on the issue of causation, like other ele-
ments of the negligence case, is normally on the plaintiff.3 4 He must
show by the greater weight of the evidence, 5 be it direct or circum-
stantial, that defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in con-
tributing to the injury. But he need not negate entirely the possi-
bility of other "causes" for which the defendant is not responsible.3 ,
Since the issue is essentially a factual determination, it should nor-
mally be one for the jury, and it has been stated that court, should
seldom rule on it as a matter of law.37
191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926).
' 198 N.C. 448, 152 S.E. 405 (1941).
" There are rare decisions which shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See
also W. PROSSER, TORTS 247 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
" There are, however, a limited number of cases in which much less than
a preponderance of the evidence is required to establish the causal link. See
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-liz-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 60 (1956). For a
rather liberal decision in the area of medical malpractice see Hicks v. United
States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv. 799 (1967).
In Bear v. Harris, 118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896), defendant moved plain-
tiff's boat without permission and it was damaged by a storm. The court
held that it was no defense to show that the damage might have been the
same or greater had the boat been at its original mooring. Where the tort
is intentional it is clear that courts will impose liability for a greater range
of consequences. Are cases such as Bear an indication that courts will also
be more lenient in establishing causation when the tort is intentional? See
e.g., Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940) (trespasser ac-
cused of causing fire).
"6 See PROSSER 246. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 433B,
comment b at 443 (1965).
"' Kearns v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 470, 476, 52 S.E. 131, 134 (1905) (dis-
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In speaking of circumstantial evidence, the court in Phelps stated:
[I]n criminal cases it [circumstantial evidence] must point un-
erringly to the guilt of the defendant, and in effect, must show
not only that the defendant is guilty but that upon no reasonable
interpretation of the evidence could he be innocent. And also,
that if the evidence is consistent with a finding of either guilt or
innocence, that the innocent interpretation must be adopted.
The law in civil cases is so similar that little difference can be
found. The innocent interpretation is applicable when we recall
that the defendant, in such cases is not required to prove his
lack of responsibility, but the plaintiff must affirmatively fix it
by the greater weight of the evidence. And it is not sufficient
to show that the circumstantial evidence introduced could have
produced the result-it must show that it did.38
Although this statement is somewhat clarified by the "greater weight
of the evidence" language near the end, it still seems totally unneces-
sary to analogize guilt in a criminal case to proof of cause in a civil
case. And to state that circumstantial evidence must show, not
that it could have produced the result, but that it did, is clearly er-
roneous. The Phelps court also cites American Jurisprudence, and
states that
[P]roof of the burning alone is not sufficient to establish lia-
bility, for if nothing more appears, the presumption is that the
fire was the result of accident or some providential cause.80
However, the cited section of American Jurisprudence deals with
the law of arson, and reads as follows:
[P]roof of the burning alone is not sufficient to establish the
corpus delicti, for if nothing more appears the presumption is
... that the fire was the result of accident or some providential
cause rather than of criminal design.
40
senting opinion) : "[I]t is also the better doctrine that where the negligent act
has been established or admitted, it is only in clear and exceptional instances
that the question of proximate cause should be withdrawn from the jury
and determined by the judge." (Emphasis added). See PROSSER 246; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 433B comment b at 443 (1965). It has
also been suggested that, as a practical matter, once it is shown that the
harm suffered by the plaintiff is clearly within the ambit of risk created by
the defendant, courts are often willing to allow the issue of cause to get
to the jury on the "slightest factual plausibility;" see Malone, Ruminations
on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
,'272 N.C. 24, 28, 157 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1967) (Emphasis added).
Id. at 31, 157 S.E.2d at 724 (Emphasis added).
405 Ams. JTJR. 2d Arson and Related Offenses § 46 at 836 (1962) (Em-
phasis added).
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How can the crime of arson, where the question is whether a criminal
agency started the fire, be analogous to a civil case where the issue
is whether an accumulation of combustible materials was the "cause"
of the fire?
Another factor may be faulty conceptualization and analysis.
For example, in Phelps the court was obviously concerned with the
possibility that an outside source ignited the combustibles as evi-
denced by statement that the origin of the fire could have been a dis-
carded cigarette or match. In making this a point of emphasis the
court indicates that it was thinking in terms of an intervening cause
which would insulate defendant from liability."' While the doctrine
of intervening cause is quite different from cause-in-fact, it is sig-
nificant to note that Phelps is in conflict with the rule which is well-
established in other jurisdictions.4 In the case where defendant had
stored paint thinner the fire did not originate from any act or omis-
sion on his part.4 3 His liability was for creating a dangerous condi-
tion which was conducive to the starting or spread of a fire. And in
B.W. King Incorporated v. Town of West New York4 the defen-
dant-municipality allowed wood, lumps of coal, coal dust and other
debris to accumulate on an unused pier. The fire was started by a
trespasser who flipped, a lighted cigarette onto the pier. The court
held that since the defendant had kept the premises in an unsafe
condition, it was liable even though the fire was started by
the act of a third party. Such an act was reasonably foreseeable as
the natural and probable consequences of the negligence. In this
respect, Phelps also seems to be in conflict with clear North Carolina
precedent. In Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Company45 lightning
struck defendant's power line and blew out an insulator. Molten
parts of the insulator fell into dry brush which had accumulated on
" On the doctrine of intervening cause see PROSSER 309.
42 The great majority of jurisdictions impose liability where defendant
has permitted his property to exist in such an unsafe condition that a fire
may easily be started, regardless of the origin of the fire. See Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 1081 (1951).
" Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60,
285 P.2d 364 (1955).
"49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967); accord, Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4
N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950).
" 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925). See Harton v. Telephone Co., 141
N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299 (1906), where the court said "the test is whether the
intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the pri-
mary negligence could have reasonably forseen and expected." Id. at 464,
54 S.E. at 302.
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the right-of-way and started the fire. The court held that defendant
was negligent in maintaining his property in such condition and
that the intervening cause did not absolve him from liability. In
Newton v. Texas Company46 defendant maintained a distributing
plant where he stored large quantities of gasoline. Gas leaked from
the warehouse and into the street. In imposing liability for the en-
suing explosion, the court said that a reasonable inference could be
drawn that the spark came from a passing train, from carelessly
discarded matches, cigarettes, or otherwise. Thus Phelps cannot be
correctly explained on the grounds of an intervening cause which
may have ignited the combustibles.
These cases indicate that the court has taken a very restrictive ap-
proach to the issue of causal relationship. While all the reasons
may not be apparent, the implications are quite clear-trial practi-
tioners who find themselves confronted with the issue of cause had
best proceed with utmost care.
JAMES G. BILLINGS
Torts-Products Liability-Is Privity Dead?
The movement to abolish the privity requirement in "warranty"
actions has in the past decade played an increasingly successful role
in the American judicial theater.' The crusade has not left the
North Carolina Supreme Court unaffected, and a recent decision by
that court may prove to be the signal for privity's final exit from the
legal stage in North Carolina.
In Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Company' the North Carolina
Supreme Court sustained a complaint based on warranty and
" 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920). The court said:
[I]f the defendant, by its negligence, produced a situation or condition
of danger by allowing gasoline to escape . . . where it would probably
come into contact with fire, sparks . . . or live ashes from a lighted
cigar or cigarette . . . we do not see why this would not be negli-
gence .... [I] f the negligence of the defendant combined with the
act of some other person . . . the defendant would be liable, though
he had no connection with the conduct of the third party and had no
control over him.
Id. at 563-64, 105 S.E. at 434.
' Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
2 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
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